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Introduction 
Jonathan Montgomery1 
Through the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, lawful human embryo 
research was restricted to specific conditions in the UK. Prior to the enactment of the 
legislation, there was no legal prohibition on such research, and the only regulation 
was voluntary. In 1990, local research ethics committees were not yet universally 
established; they were not formally mandated by NHS administrative norms, let alone 
a legal requirement.i The context in which the statutory limit on embryo research was 
debated was thus not one in which no research was happening, but one in which there 
was no legally binding regulation.ii 
When the legislation came before them, parliamentarians were offered a choice 
between prohibiting all embryo research and permitting it in defined circumstances 
and for a limited range of prescribed purposes. They chose the latter course and 
legislated that embryos could not be kept or used ‘after the appearance of the primitive 
streak’. This is a potentially ambiguous biological term, but it has been given more 
precise legal definition by the gloss that ‘the primitive streak is to be taken to have 
appeared in an embryo not later than the end of the period of 14 days beginning with 
the day on which the process of creating the embryo began, not counting any time 
during which the embryo is stored’.iii Strictly, therefore, the rule should be described 
as the ‘primitive streak rule’ not the ‘14-day rule’. This possible significance of this 
distinction between biological and chronological divisions is discussed below. 
Although initially controversial, this statutory limit has been maintained for over 25 
years.iv During this time, there was no scientific prospect of sustaining embryos in vitro 
beyond the permitted period. That changed in 2016 with the publication of two papers 
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in Nature.v Some have asked whether this meant that the question of the limitations 
on embryo research should be revisited. The Nuffield Council on Bioethics decided to 
convene a workshop with group of experts from a range of fields and disciplines to 
explore whether there was a case for a more detailed piece of work on the issue.  
This report contains the background paper that was commissioned to provide a 
context for the discussion along with a note of the discussions from the day. The 
discussions were held under the Chatham House Rule so that themes and issues are 
recorded but not attributed to individuals in order to facilitate the most candid exchange 
of views possible. Participants, including those who were invited but were unable to 
attend the meeting, were given the opportunity to provide short comments in order to 
ensure that a broad range of perspectives was adequately represented. These 
observations are also set out later this this document. We hope that these materials 
will provide a resource for those, who are considering whether there is a case for 
revisiting the limits on embryo research. For the present, the Council does not aim to 
reach any conclusion on the merits of the issue, which would require much more 
detailed work, but to draw out the questions that would need to be addressed by those 
who advocate a review.  
Jurisdictional functions of the rule  
It is perhaps helpful to remind ourselves of the jurisdictional functions of the 14-day 
rule. These serve to explain those roles that are played by a rule of this sort, which are 
independent of the point at which the rule is fixed. It is likely that any proposal to revisit 
the rule will need to take these functions into account.  
First, the rule limits the jurisdiction of the licensing authority to authorise research 
involving human embryos. This is a regulatory tool, and is not necessarily a 
mechanism for directly translating a moral judgment on the status of the embryo. 
Fourteen days is not the point at which special respect is conferred by the law. That is 
accorded to all human embryos, which are protected by the prohibition of unlicensed 
storage and use.vi Behind this prohibition lie the creation of a dedicated ethics 
committee and the specification of limitations on the purposes for which research may 
be permitted.  However, the structure of the regulatory system is essentially similar to 
that for the use of non-embryonic human tissue, and so is not necessarily connected 
with personhood issues and the particular status issues around the human embryo. It 
is also similar to the regulatory structure for oversight of animal research. Each of 
those creates a prohibition of activities, with powers in a licensing authority to permit 
them within certain limits and subject to oversight.  The 14-day rule sits within a 
regulatory framework that accords some respect to all human embryos at whatever 
stage of development. The specific questions raised by the rule are, therefore, not 
concerned with whether respect should be accorded to the human embryo but with 
what respect requires when it comes to be balanced against other competing, publicly 
valued, interests.  
The relationship between this aspect of the rule and the moral status of the embryo is 
therefore indirect. It plays a function within a wider regulatory system and it is 
necessary to consider that system as a whole in order to assess whether due regard 
has been paid to the moral significance of the embryo. The 14-day rule serves to 
distinguish those cases where the law has determined that the moral value of the 
embryo will always preclude the pursuit of knowledge through research from those in 
which a ‘balancing exercise’ needs to be separately undertaken into each research 
proposal.vii Under the current framework, human embryo research cannot be lawful in 
pursuit of the recognised objectives after 14 days, no matter how important the results 
might be. However, in the period before this, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority (HFEA) is empowered to license projects provided that the statutory 
purposes that Parliament laid down are being pursued. In effect, it distinguishes ethical 
questions that are to be regarded as closed from those which are to be treated as 
open to further reflection.    
The second of the jurisdictional functions that is served by the 14-day rule is to reserve 
the decision to amend (or not) the rule to Parliament. In most areas of reproductive 
ethics, the HFEA was given supervisory stewardship responsibility.viii However, its 
opportunities to determine the ethics of embryo research have been severely curtailed 
by the Act. This applies to the grounds on which such research can be justifiedix as 
well the time- or development-based limit.x   Parliament has reserved its sovereignty 
over these aspects of embryo research and any change would need to be justified in 
terms that would persuade it to legislate differently. The next section considers some 
implications of this for the structure of an argument for reform. 
There is also little or no scope for the courts to have a say in the point of embryo 
development at which the line between ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ research is 
drawn. In principle, the need to classify new entities, such as the recently generated 
‘synthetic human entities with embryo-like features’ (SHEEFs), might be seen as an 
opportunity for judges to drive policy.xi However, litigation  over how cloning should 
classified suggests a recognition that the intention of Parliament to create a 
comprehensive regulatory framework will lead to judges construing new techniques in 
a way that incorporates them into the special regulatory framework rather than 
developing a judicially defined legal status.xii Provision is already made for Parliament 
to make regulations to bring within the definition of embryo entities that contain human 
DNA but would not otherwise be included.xiii Arguments based on current definitions, 
common law and human rights law, are therefore not material to the question with 
which we are concerned here. 
The 14-day rule played a third jurisdictional function during the Parliamentary debates 
on embryo research in 1990. This was to maintain a focus on the question that the 
Government wanted to be considered, that is, research on very early embryonic 
development. Without such a limit, the debate could properly have encompassed a 
range of developmental stages from a small number of undifferentiated embryonic 
cells to a fully formed fetus with a reasonable chance surviving outside the womb. 
The recommendations in the ‘Warnock Report’ of 1984, which foreshadowed the 1990 
legislation, were concerned with ‘the very earliest stages of human embryonic 
development’ and were crafted in order to limit permissible research to this period.xiv 
The Report was fully aware of the possibility of scientific development and the demand 
that might lead some to seek research at a later stage. It identified a number of 
potential future developments, including use of human embryos to test drugs and 
ectogenesis (‘creating a child entirely in vitro’).xv The former becomes a particular 
issue of interest with the advent of SHEEFs.xvi It noted that some argued that the latter 
‘would make it possible to study in detail normal and abnormal human development at 
the embryonic and foetal stages’.xvii The Report addresses this issue by saying the 
following: 
“We appreciate why the possibility of such a technique arouses so much 
anxiety. There are however two points to make about this. First, such 
developments are well into the future, certainly beyond the time horizon within 
which this Inquiry feels it can predict. Secondly, our recommendation is that the 
growing of a human embryo in vitro beyond fourteen days should be a criminal 
offence.”xviii 
Thus, the 14-day rule served the jurisdictional purpose of limiting the discussion of 
human embryo research in a way that ensured that some concerns, such as those 
about sentient beings becoming non-consensual research subjects, could be excluded 
from the scope of debate. This did not stop them being raised by some 
parliamentarians in debate, but it enabled Ministers to respond reasonably by saying 
the strict limits provided reassurance that such developments were not under 
consideration in the vote before them. It is probable that any re-opening of the 14-day 
rule would need to find an equivalent jurisdictional device to delineate the debate.  
This continuing need for a clearly defined line is independent of the question of how a 
proposed limit might be justified. As the discussion of the origins of the current rule set 
out in this report show, there may be a variety of justifications offered for a limit and, if 
the decision is for Parliament, it is not necessary for there to be agreement on these 
justifications. Lawmakers may have independent, and even incompatible, reasons for 
supporting a particular limit provided that a consensus is reached on the desirability of 
the outcome. However, it is unlikely that a different line would be acceptable to 
legislators if it were considered ‘arbitrary’ in the sense of being random and without 
any reasoned basis.xix  
The justification of a jurisdictional division to play the equivalent function of the 14-day 
rule need not necessarily be found in biological development, although much of the 
discussion explores such possibilities. The legislation explicitly links this time limit with 
the emergence of the primitive streak, but there has never been a consensus on why 
this is morally significant. The Warnock Committee explained it in terms of the 
beginning of individuation.xx In Parliamentary debates, this was elaborated as 
indicating the final point at which twinning might occur.xxi The Warnock Committee 
considered a range of other points at which a line might be drawn. It noted that for 
utilitarians, there might be significance in the beginnings of a central nervous system 
(at around 22–23 days) or functional activity that would show that pain could be felt 
(not known in 1984), with the precautionary assumption that the legal limit should be 
fixed a few days earlier in order that there would be no possibility of pain.xxii Some 
have taken this as a supplementary justification for the 14-day rule. This is not explicit 
in the original Warnock Report, although there is a reference to the view of the Royal 
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists that a 17-day limit might be appropriate, 
corresponding to the point at which early neural development begins.xxiii These are 
developmental markers. However, there was also some discussion of the relevance 
of implantation, which will never be an actual stage for an embryo in vitro.xxiv  
Discussions at the Council’s workshop also hinted at a different type of argument, 
based on the availability of other sources of information. This approach would suggest 
a limit that was fixed to ensure that embryos were not used in research when the 
relevant data could be gathered in other ways. As explained later in this Report, 
knowledge of early human development is based on the Carnegie Collection of human 
embryos.xxv Where this is incomplete, early human development is a ‘black box’ into 
which we cannot see.xxvi This knowledge base can be supplemented and refined in a 
number of different ways. The current legal framework enables research up to the end 
of day 14. From around 28 days, scientists can glean information from examining 
embryos that have been lost in miscarried pregnancies. We might see this an 
‘obscured window’ into human embryo development. A veil of ignorance lies over the 
period between 15 and 28 days.xxvii The time limit on embryo research thus might be 
fixed not by reference to a developmental stage but by the availability of other sources 
of information. 
The structure of the case for embryo research 
Building on these reflections on the origins and functions of the 14-day rule, it is 
possible to draw out from the debates over human embryo research in the period that 
led up to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 the structure of any future 
case for revisiting it. The parliamentary decision constituted a collective conclusion 
that the prospects for public benefit from embryo research could sometimes outweigh 
the restraining presumption against it. If legislators were persuaded that this might 
sometimes be the case, then decisions on individual research projects could properly 
be delegated to the HFEA. Parliament has already revisited this question in relation to 
the component of the law relating to embryo research that concerns the permitted 
purposes, and been persuaded that the prospect of useful scientific knowledge is 
sufficiently important to justify extending the permitted purposes.xxviii 
The first limb of any case for changing the 14-day rule would therefore need to be a 
compelling case that significant scientific gains can reasonably be expected from an 
extension of the period in which research was permitted. Without such a case, there 
is no reason to reopen the rule. This case could be based on arguments that we have 
good reason to think that an extension in the time permitted for research would bring 
knowledge within our grasp that would enable us to address issues of public 
importance. It would also be appropriate to show that only extended embryo research 
can be expected to deliver those benefits.  
Those who are concerned about the possibility that the 14-day question should be 
revisited point to a number of weaknesses in the scientific case. The benefits of 
extending research further have not been clearly articulated. Critics of existing embryo 
research raise concerns that it has not delivered the benefits that it promised and 
counsel about being taken in by hype. They also point out that, until very recently, 
researchers have only been able to sustain embryos in vitro for about seven days. It 
may be premature to be thinking about extending the rule until we know more about 
the period between days seven and 14. The interest in doing so now looks to many 
critics like a classic example of a ‘slippery slope’, where regulatory measures that were 
claimed to curtail a scientific free-for-all are removed as soon as they begin to operate 
in that fashion.xxix But it is not necessary to be a critic of embryo research to conclude 
that public confidence in its governance depends on the 14-day rule operating as a 
real constraint and, if there is to be change, then the scientific case will need to be 
compelling.xxx 
The second limb of such a case would be the identification of a new regulatory 
constraint that could play the jurisdictional roles identified in the previous section. That 
is: it needs to be clear enough to provide a workable definition of the powers of the 
HFEA for the purpose of legal accountability; it needs to be narrow enough to ensure 
that Parliament retains oversight; finally, it needs to be robust enough to give 
Parliamentarians confidence that they are not committing themselves to a broader 
acceptance of research than they are being invited to consider. 
Untimely arguments 
The explanation of the role of the 14-day rule that was outlined above suggests that 
some of the arguments about human embryo research that could be made should be 
disregarded for the purposes of a narrow reconsideration of the rule. These can 
crudely be summarised as those that argue for two positions that would make the rule 
superfluous. For those who believe that no research involving human embryos is ever 
permissible and also to those who believe that no special respect is owed to such 
embryos, the 14-day rule is merely a tactical device that secured a truce in a deeper 
clash of values. Our workshop did not seek to engage with that wider debate, although 
it is noted by a number contributors.xxxi It is, of course, difficult to exclude the 
fundamental question of the status of the human embryo from discussion but our brief 
was to concentrate on the ways in which it becomes intertwined with arguments 
addressed more specifically to the 14-day rule itself and any possible replacement. 
This report is intended to make a contribution to understanding the role and rationale 
of the rule. If it were decided to revisit the regulation of embryo research, these two 
positions would need to be given full consideration. It is not necessarily the case that 
the 14-day rule, or an alternative playing a similar set of jurisdictional roles, would 
ultimately be considered appropriate if the issue of embryo research were revisited.  
A second set of arguments that were outside the scope of this piece of work but that 
would be relevant to a full reconsideration concern the relationship of the 14-day 
question to other social currents. We have already noted concerns about ‘slippery 
slope’ arguments that are held in some quarters. It is likely that any discussion of the 
embryo research rules would be affected by public confidence in the integrity of 
scientists. The experience of recent Parliamentary interventions, such as the 
developments in the regulation of mitochondrial replacement therapies, would also be 
relevant. It is likely, also, that connections would be made between the embryo 
research debate and discussions about the law on abortion.  
For these reasons, and no doubt for others besides, this brief review of the issues is 
much more narrowly focused than would be required if we were hoping to reach a 
conclusion on whether it was appropriate to extend the circumstances in which embryo 
research could be licensed. Nor has our discussion aimed to move towards any 
recommendation about the form any replacement for the 14-day rule might take. 
Rather, we have aimed to scope the issues that would need to be examined so that 
an informed view can be taken on whether this is the correct time to consider a change 
in the law. 
 Reflections 
In the light of these considerations, the contributions here recognise the scientific 
value of the recent advances in sustaining embryos (not just human embryos) in vitro 
for longer periods of time. This offers exciting prospects for learning more about 
embryo development. Our current knowledge of embryo development is much less 
secure than many might imagine. In general terms, there is reason to think that 
understanding early embryo development better is likely to shed light on the causes 
of miscarriage.  This is a major cause of distress and unhappiness. However, the 
workshop did not identify particular reasons for thinking that rapid progress could be 
made with research into embryos for extended periods. It seems unlikely that 
Parliament would entertain a change in the law without having a much more clearly 
articulated scientific case to consider. 
The workshop did not set out to establish whether there was a preferred candidate for 
a new limit for research that could satisfactorily replace the existing one. However, we 
anticipated that some plausible options would emerge in the discussion. A number of 
biological markers were identified and there was also some discussion of incremental 
progression based on time alone. Some possible adaptations to the way in which the 
rule functioned were raised. It might, for example, be possible to consider extending 
permissible embryo culture for some or all of the period between 15 and 28 days but 
only in order to permit observational studies, with interventional research being 
proscribed during this period. It might be possible to restrict the range of legitimate 
purposes for any extended period more narrowly than those that currently apply up to 
the end of day 14. It might also be possible to improve the regulation of embryo 
research by introducing a principle of economy, equivalent to the ‘refine, reduce and 
replace’ (3Rs) objective in relation to animal research.xxxii These are all valuable 
observations. There was no consensus as to which approach would be most ethically 
satisfactory, nor which would be most likely to secure the public acceptance that is 
widely thought to be the key to the durability of the current 14-day rule. 
Insofar as there are conclusions to be drawn from this workshop, it would seem that 
there is not at this stage a clear case for change of the sort that would persuade 
legislators of the need for action, either in relation to the prospect of scientific benefit 
or in relation to the availability of a satisfactory alternative regulatory tool. The 
regulation of human embryo research remains an important and interesting bioethical 
question but it is not clear why the question of the 14-day rule should be regarded as 
a priority for those charged with developing public policy in the area at present. 
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